From Hudson Review, Summer 1990 (43, #2), pp.
245-56.
SYLVIA PLATH, HUNGER ARTIST
By Harold Fromm
With the appearance of yet another
life of Sylvia Plath, the cultural observer may very
well wonder whether the world really needs three biographies in a period of
less than fifteen years. Plath's literary reputation
is founded, after all, upon a handful of startling poems and a seemingly
accessible novel, The Bell Jar, that
in reality may be not so much accessible as adaptable to political uses. After
her suicide in 1963, her writings sold like editions of the National Enquirer, providing a
convenient sand box for voyeurs and crude feminists on the lookout for mudpie effigies of "Daddy." But once the more sensational aspects of the Plath phenomenon began to pale, it became possible to focus
upon her poetic craft, frequently at the expense of the tortured consciousness
that nourished it. Since biographies, however, both reflect and influence the
history of literary reception of which they are a part, Anne Stevenson's new
version of the life of Sylvia Plath turns out to be
anything but supererogatory.[1. BITTER FAME: a Life of Sylvia Plath, by Anne
Stevenson. Houghton Mifflin, $19.95.]
Edward Butscher's
pioneering work of 1976, Sylvia Plath: Method and Madness [2. New York, 1976.], though
nowadays disparaged, was a remarkable achievement for someone to whom the major
archives were unavailable. It was not until 1977 that Indiana University
purchased the bulk of Plath's letters and other
valuable materials from her mother, Aurelia Schober Plath, nor until 1981 that Ted Hughes sold another very
large cache of his wife's manuscripts to Smith College. Letters Home, Aurelia Plath's edition of
letters, mostly to herself from Sylvia, appeared only in time for Butscher to mention it in his notes. Without having seen
the bulk of Plath's journals or letters, Butscher managed to extract an extraordinary database from
interviews with survivors and to get more than the general outlines of her life
quite right. It was already well-known that the death of her father when she
was eight was a blow from which she never seemed to recover, that she was
nurtured by a loving mother and grandparents, and that she had a brilliant
career at Smith College, during which she published poems and fiction in
national periodicals and won several prizes. After miraculously surviving her
first suicide attempt at twenty-one and recovering in a mental hospital, she
returned to Smith, won a Fulbright to England for a second undergraduate degree
at Cambridge, met and married Ted Hughes and had two children. It was a
relationship that worked wonders for both their craft and fame, until things
began to unhinge.
Butscher's
thematic characterization of Plath as "bitch
goddess" was hardly wide of the mark. His insight into her precarious
psyche was convincing, and his appreciation of her poetic genius very sensitive
indeed. What prevented definitiveness, however, besides the limited
documentation, was his wildly excessive psychologizing;
his readiness to swallow the program of feminist-ascribed ills that patriarchal
society was reputed to have foisted upon Sylvia as a woman, including an
extreme hostility to Aurelia Plath, whom he treated
as an almost malevolent agent of patriarchal bourgeois repressivity
and conventionality; his excessively long accounts of minor events for which he
happened to have a lot of information; the absence of material about important
moments in Plath's life, as well as a very thin
account of Ted Hughes and the breakup of their marriage, which had the effect
(if not the intention) of putting the burden of blame upon Hughes in default of
his side of the story; and by no means least of all, his egregiously extensive,
rather unintelligible readings of Plath's poems.
Nevertheless, his accomplishment was more than nugatory.
Whereas Butscher's
prose was feverishly overcharged and portentous ("Spurred by the double
tragedy of miscarriage and appendectomy...." ), Linda Wagner-Martin's 1987
biography successfully avoided this and most of Butscher's
other liabilities as well. The writing is plain and lucid (to the point of
flat-footedness at times); Plath's poems and fiction
are used edifyingly, without any of Butscher's clumsiness; Aurelia Plath
is treated as a benign platonic idea of motherly selflessness; the point of
view is feminist but seemingly controlled ("Plath
knew that, because she was a woman writer, her work would be judged by
standards different from those used to judge the work of male writers.")
[3. Linda Wagner-Martin, Sylvia Plath: A Biography (New York, 1987), p. 12.]; the
account makes use of just about every document, published and unpublished,
available at the time of writing, as well as more than 200 interviews; and the
narration is cool and factual with little overt "interpretation."
Indeed, Wagner-Martin's excellent "Introduction" to her 1984
collection of writings about Sylvia Plath, reveals
more openly than her biography her enthusiastic feminist commitment.
Interpreting the 1982 Pulitzer Prize for
The Collected Poems as proof that
"the power of Plath's art finally won out--over
all the detractors, the enviers, the death-mongers," she goes on to
observe that "had Plath been only a suicidal
poet, writing in a narrow and obsessively limited voice," such recognition
could never have taken place.[4. Critical
Essays on Sylvia Plath,, ed. Linda Wagner
(Boston, 1984), p. 1.] Yet although Wagner-Martin uses both the letters home
and the journals--a schizophrenic duality if there ever was one--to provide
concrete documentation of Plath's dizzying mental
swings, she could not resist either the downplayings
or the heightenings that her feminism, however
controlled, seemed to require. Thus, apart from the absence in her account of
any words like "madness," or "schizophrenic," or
"manic-depressive," she attributes Plath's
rage, depressions, and bitchiness merely to "childhood years of loss and
perceived abandonment," has little
to say about Sylvia's discomfitingly ill-tempered
relationship with Ted's sister, Olwyn Hughes (and a
lot of other people), and excuses the almost unprecedented malice of her
literary use of family and friends with remarks like "Plath's
depiction of her mother and other female characters may trouble the reader who
knows her biography, but The Bell Jar
is fiction, and in fiction real people are transformed." Even more
surprisingly, she devotes only one sentence to such indelible events as
Sylvia's destruction of Ted's work in progress--his play, poems, notebooks,
drafts, and even his favorite edition of Shakespeare--on one of the many
paranoid occasions when she imagined him to be flirting with other women, a
destruction that was not to be the last. Although Wagner-Martin's quotations
from the journals make it perfectly clear that Plath's
psyche was a maelstrom of raging conflicts, the effect of her narrative
understatement is to counteract Plath's own words,
producing sympathy for the "victim." And while she herself is not
hard upon Ted Hughes, praising the excellences of their marriage while
stressing that it was Sylvia who banished him when he finally was having an affair, she is too partial
to Sylvia's point of view, perhaps because she has so little information from
any other.
Wagner-Martin's increasingly
fractious relationship with Olwyn Hughes, which she
details in her "Preface," undoubtedly provided an obstacle course
which she had to get around by cutting and paraphrasing when Olwyn and Ted began to make increasingly demanding
editorial decisions in exchange for permissions to quote. Though it is never
made entirely clear what the Hugheses were objecting
to, their grounds for objection are now largely clarified by the appearance of
Stevenson's Bitter Fame.
If Wagner-Martin's apologies for
Sylvia Plath suggest that art overcomes everything,
especially if the art is female, Anne Stevenson's aim is to redress the balance
with fresh information that reveals more of the "everything" that up
until now has been slighted. Greatly indebted to Olwyn
Hughes for permissions and direct help, she describes her book as "almost
a work of dual authorship," and in this case, at least, it may very well
be that two heads have been better than any previous single one. "Until
now," she informs us, "a whole side of [Plath's]
story--that of her marriage--has been inadequately or erroneously presented.
This was due primarily to Ted Hughes's understandable insistence on the privacy
of his life and the lives of his children.... Much of the new material will
surprise those who have accepted the current view of Sylvia Plath." But more than new material is involved. What
becomes apparent from the very first paragraph of Stevenson's preface is that
this is going to be an actively interpretive biography, fusing together all of
the previously expressed points of view with new information and outlooks that
throw everything slightly askew. Her technique of synthesis-cum-interpretation
can be seen in a discussion of Sylvia's obsession with her father, an obsession
that, in "Daddy," produced a "tangle of imagery--illogical,
surreal, untrue as to the fact but inseparable from Sylvia's psychic
reality." Inexorably, "in her peculiarly hallucinatory
imagination," her father Otto "would emerge from the shadow side of
Sylvia's stories and poems as the Proteus of her Herculean effort to free
herself of his image. Menacingly, irresistibly, he would reappear in her work
as a Colossus, a sea-god muse, a drowned suicide, an archetypal Greek king, a
beekeeper (brave master of a dangerous colony), even, as in the famous poem
"Daddy," a fictitiously brutal combination of husband and Luftwaffe
Nazi." Compressed, intense, jolting, and decidedly non-feminist,
Stevenson's accounts are less a matter of radical revelation than of someone
lighting a fuse that has always been dangling in the attentive reader's
peripheral vision.
What is, strictly speaking, new in
this life is the light it sheds on the mysterious breakup of the Hugheses' marriage, the early signs of which Stevenson and Olwyn Hughes are in a position to provide. Of course, the
strain of domestic life for six years with someone as emotionally volatile as
Sylvia, whose barely repressed angers often erupted into terrible scenes among
friends, had even in the earlier biographies appeared as grounds for marital
conflict. Now we learn how the "bright and smiling mask" that Sylvia
presented was so often followed by rages, and how Ted Hughes found these moods
"largely unaccountable: they began and ended like electric storms, and he
came to learn simply to accept their occurrence," sometimes with only a gesture of helplessness.
"He had tried to reason with Sylvia on similar occasions, he said, but it
was no use. She adamantly refused anything that sounded like criticism and
simply became hysterical." Visits to his parents in Yorkshire produced
tense and painful scenes that caused Ted to write his sister in an attempt to
account for Sylvia's bizarre behavior. And elsewhere in the narrative, Lucas
Myers, Olwyn Hughes, Richard Murphy, and others
reflect upon their own disastrous encounters with Sylvia, the most intense of
which is an long addendum in which Dido Merwin
reports on Sylvia's fits of jealousy regarding other women (in her journals, Plath comments on some of these events herself). Stevenson
even records Aurelia Plath's disarray at Sylvia's
treatment of Ted while she is visiting them in England, as well as an epiphanal passage from a letter in which Mrs. Plath remarks that Sylvia "made use of everything and
often transmuted gold into lead.... These emotions in another person would
dissipate with time, but with Sylvia they were written at the moment of
intensity to become ineradicable as an epitaph engraved on a tombstone."
In Anne Stevenson's account of the Hugheses, the
reader is prepared for disaster long before it finally takes place.
Although this narrative is highly
critical of Plath throughout, there is no a priori reason why the perspective from
the Hughes side should be any more inaccurate than the perspective from the
more familiar Plath one. Indeed, though A. Alvarez,
an old Plath supporter, seemed outraged by
Stevenson's biography in his New York
Review of Books account (Sept. 28, 1989), he had very little quarrel with
anything in particular that Stevenson had to say--he just didn't like it:
"Thereafter the picture builds steadily of a sick and fragile personality,
probably borderline psychotic, subject to unreasonable and unreasoning rages
and fits of jealousy, exaggerated enthusiasms and inky depressions, who spent
her life secretly raging against a father who had abandoned her by dying when
she was eight years old." Unable to disagree with this characterization,
he soothes his vexation by shifting gears into the Ars
Vincit Omnia mode that we
have already seen in Wagner-Martin: "However far gone she was at the end,
she also possessed enormous powers of recovery and was in touch with an
incomparably rich inner world. Whence the power and beauty of her last poems,
and also their extraordinary detachment." After quoting Plath's valedictory last poem, "Edge," he
concludes: "What matters here is not the Medea-like
tragedy but the uncanny artistic detachment that allows the imagery to develop
its own lucid, calm life."
If the first period of Plath reception could be thought of as the "madness
and melodrama" phase, the second period, which perhaps may now be drawing
to a close, could be called the "transcendence of art" phase. Given
this latter mode of reception, it becomes imperative that we not miss two
passing comments that Anne Stevenson and Olwyn Hughes
make in the course of Bitter Fame--marking
a radical departure from previous treatments of Sylvia Plath--because
despite the general boldness of their book, their voices at these moments
betray a trace of timorousness and qualification, as they eye the pile of
bricks waiting in readiness to be thrown at them. Speaking of the startling
nature of Plath's "Daddy," "the shock
of pure fury...the smoldering rage with which she is declaring herself free,
both of ghostly father and of husband," Stevenson concludes, "The
implication is that after this exorcism her life can begin again, that she will
be reborn. And indeed on ethical grounds
[emphasis added] only a desperate bid for life and psychic health can even
begin to excuse this and several other of the Ariel poems." And on the
biography's final, emphatic page, where the feminist vandals of Plath's tombstone are also excoriated, Stevenson quotes Olwyn Hughes: "Sylvia may be a počte maudit, but she is an achieved mature
one: her work is hermetic, even, on
ethical grounds [emphasis added], questionable. But as art it is unassailable."
This introduction of ethics, the implications of which have so angered A.
Alvarez and the Ars Vincit Omnia crowd, becomes all the more worth considering in the
light of the present climate in which Heidegger, Eliot, Pound, and even
Mencken, are being raked over the coals for their ethical shortcomings. So it
is tempting to say, "And why not Plath?"
But a more general question might be
tackled first: Just what was Sylvia Plath's "problem?" The consensus seems to be that
Plath was unable to forge a coherent self from the
multiple and warring fragments of her psyche. She remained a captive of the
"primary processes," of the pre-social and pre-linguistic unconscious
where time and space are minimal, and where desires manipulate the contents of
consciousness to produce satisfaction at any cost, including the gratifications
of hallucination. Her journals and letters home are blatant documents of this
phenomenon, which is the most pervasive characteristic of all her writings.
These journals and the letters to her mother represent "selves" so
radically opposed that one can hardly believe they are emanations of the same
person, the journals so agonized and self-lacerating, the letters so gushingly
chirpy and upbeat, often with regard to the very same events. But Plath herself recognized this problem only too well, as the
journals themselves reveal:
God, is this all
it is, the ricocheting down the corridor of laughter and tears? of self-worship
and self-loathing? of glory and disgust?
Frustrated? Yes.
Why? Because it is impossible for me to be God--or the universal
woman-and-man--or anything much....But if I am to express what I am, I must
have a standard of life, a jumping-off place, a technique--to make arbitrary
and temporary organization of my own personal and pathetic little chaos.
I have the choice
of being constantly active and happy or introspectively passive and sad. Or I
can go mad by ricocheting in between.[5. The
Journals of Sylvia Plath (New York, 1982), pp.
13, 23, 24.]
But early on she
also recognized the "solution": "Writing makes me a small god: I
re-create the flux and smash of the world through the small ordered word
patterns I make. I have powerful physical, intellectual and emotional forces
which must have outlets, creative, or they turn to destruction and waste."
The resolution is frightening: "My house of days and masks is rich enough
so that I might and must spend years fishing, hauling up the pearl-eyed, horny,
scaled and sea-bearded monsters sunk long, long in the Sargasso of my imagination."
And the most interesting of her reflections is not found in her journals at all
but in a high school diary quoted by Aurelia Plath in
Letters Home: "I want, I think,
to be omniscient...I think I would like to call myself 'The girl who wanted to
be God.' Yet if I were not in this body, where would I be--perhaps I am destined
to be classified and qualified. But, oh, I cry out against it. I am I--I am
powerful--but to what extent? I am I." [6. New York, 1975, p.40]
As things turned out, however, Plath was never able to form a coherent public self and she
remained indeed almost free of classification and qualification. Her letters
and behavior were so kaleidoscopic that they seemed to derive from no central,
public, or "ego" core. She appeared to be comprised of two computer
programs: an unalterable hardware program (a ROM of primary process), and a RAM
software program that--like many computer games--gave the illusion of
interactive behavior with other people, although it was really just serendipitous
coincidence. As she grew older and moved away from her supernormal golden girl
period in which she could still aim to please, her immutable, pre-programmed,
read-only-memory took over, and her ability to interact "correctly,"
i.e. "sanely," with an outside world kept decreasing until it reached
zero. Had she not killed herself at 30, she would doubtless have done so at 31,
since no wherewithal for human interaction remained: the computer had crashed.
Speaking of her multitude of "false selves," and her gradual arrival
at her "true" one, Ted Hughes--much too optimistically--writes in his
Foreward to the journals that "Ariel and the associated later poems
give us the voice of that [true] self. They are the proof that it arrived. All
her other writings, except these journals, are the waste products of its
gestation." Those "waste products," however, happened to be the
residual shreds of her sanity.
In her brilliant explication of Plath's personal mythology as a moon-goddess and the role
that mythology played in her poems, Judith Kroll succeeds in demonstrating that
the earlier poems are often unsuccessful because the mythology is imposed from
without, like stale and allusive poetic conventions, whereas in the celebrated
later poems the mythology has been so internalized that the poems are
organically whole--though completely obscure if the reader is unable to
decipher the terms of the system. [7. Judith Kroll, Chapters in a Mythology: The Poetry of Sylvia Plath
(New York, 1976) Kroll has a tendency to
overexplain the poems, making them too coherent. When
one return to the poems themselves, they often seem as obscure as they did in
the first place.] Few concessions are
made to a recognizable public world in these late poems, which are almost
totally symbolic of Plath's primary processes as her
life fell apart and she withdrew into her primordial self. In their perverse
way, some of these poems may seem "perfect" (if one has cracked their
code) but the ultimate cost, both for the author and the reader, exceeds the
cost of almost any other poems that come to mind. (And thinking back on the
castrati of eighteenth century opera, one may legitimately wonder at what point
the cost of art becomes too high for
any possible justification.) For Plath's "true
self" consisted of the purest primary processes uncompromised by
interaction with reality, un"classified"
and un"qualified" by others. From this stem
her unremitting rages against everybody about everything, rages that had no
real grounds or objects but which were part of her original resistance to lost
omnipotence, which recognized that an uncontrollable outside world required a
farewell to all delusions of godhood. During her last stage of life, however,
her rages subsided as she shut down the doorways of perception and withdrew
completely into a quasi-mystical, once-again omnipotent private universe. At
the age of two months, we call this sense of omnipotence "normality."
At the age of thirty, the conventional word for such a state is
"madness."
But before returning to
"ethics," there are two other questions about Plath
that still must be addressed, her "feminism" and her
"craft." Although Plath speaks early in her
journals about her discontents with being a woman ("I can only lean
enviously against the boundary and hate, hate, hate the boys who can dispel
sexual hunger freely, without misgiving, and be whole, while I drag out from
date to date in soggy desire, always unfulfilled"), as well as her
distaste for the prospect of spending her life making scrambled eggs for some
man, as time passes she takes up--with a greedy vengeance--the roles of femme
fatale and then procreative mother. In this, as in everything else, she
entertained virtually every possible view, every possible self, from virginally
pious daughter to roaring bitch to moon-goddess to adoring mother to bourgeois
puritan, and intermixed with all of them was a powerful attraction to men. None
of these selves can be accorded more authentic priority than any of the others.
Had there been ten possible sexes instead of two, she would have raged against
each of them seriatim, since it was not femaleness or maleness that she hated
but incarnation itself. To be a
creature in space and time was to be limited, classified, qualified, and to her
this was wildly insupportable. Nor was she able to take responsibility for any of her incarnations. Her real life
took place amidst the timelessness of mythology and not amidst the crap and
piss of mortality.
As for craft, in the sixties Irving
Howe characterized her as "an interesting minor poet," a verdict
against which there has been considerable resistance. Alvarez and Wagner-Martin
are representative of the way in which all other aspects of Sylvia Plath's existence have been pushed aside in order to extol
her extraordinary craft. The question of major or minor status is not a matter
of fact, so with regard to poetic craft Sylvia Plath
may be as major as any poet in English. But with regard to the larger
"world" upon which poetic craft operates--its subject matter,
substance, and moral direction, as well as its relation to human life and
possibility--it would be utterly preposterous to compare her with such
undisputed major poets as Milton, Wordsworth, or Yeats, or even more debatable
cases like Shelley, Tennyson, or Eliot.
Richard Crashaw may well be her closest counterpart.
For we expect from major writers a consciousness-raising operation, an opening
up of the reader's experience to the complexities of a larger world, from which
Sylvia Plath was completely cut off. Even her most
accessible poems are largely incapable of changing the way in which we
experience the world, since she had little interest in anything incarnated,
apart from the recondite drama of her own primordial psyche. We learn from her
most acclaimed poems only about the aberrations of this-particular-psyche-here,
little about a world out there. Experience, for her, was only raw material to
be fitted to the opening of her holocaustic funnel and then sucked into the
savage tornado of her immutable myth. If her experience is taken to have
anything to do with a public world, it can only produce the outrage and
vexation that Anne Stevenson and Olwyn Hughes express
when they contemplate the horrible rape and mutilation that Plath's
writings performed on her mother, her father, and her husband--and everyone
else as well--as she incorporated them into the other-worldly distortions of
her solipsistic psychodrama.
Although I sympathize
completely with Anne Stevenson's and Olwyn Hughes's introduction of the question of ethical
responsibility, since human beings, even when they are poets, must be dealt
with according to conventional human values as long as they are actors in a
communal world; and although no amount of "craft" can exonerate artists
from the responsibilities of being a person, because craft is not enough--it seems to me that ethical obligations can be
justly required only from human beings we consider free agents, however
relative the term "free." But
it is very hard to look upon Sylvia Plath in any such
light. If her madness was as controlling a force as I judge it to be, the
options of ethical responsibility would not appear to have been available to
her, since her range of choice was perilously confined, and she scattered ruin
on everything she touched. Where the question of ethics really arises, as I see
it, is among those of her admirers who insist on brushing aside all of these
important considerations of human values in order to affirm that craft is
everything and overrides everything else. The matter is far from simple, and
though it may ultimately be regarded as undecidable
(as in the cases of Heidegger, Pound, et al.), undecidability
is a much better resolution of this dilemma than unqualified admiration.
Mankind simply cannot live by craft alone, and if poets qualify as members of
mankind, there is no way they can escape the value systems that bind whoever
would call himself a member of any particular human society.
Like Kafka's hunger artist, Sylvia Plath was an unworldly specialist in suffering who
performed in front of the peanut-crunching crowd that both applauded and
doubted the authenticity of her performance. She too knew "how easy it was
to fast," because her hunger was not satisfied by anything available in
this world. "I have to fast," the hunger artist informs his overseer,
"I can't help it, because I couldn't find the food I liked. If I had found
it, I should have made no fuss and stuffed myself like you or anyone
else." Like the hunger artist, Plath depended on
craft as surrogate for the substance of this world, a craft of mythmaking words
to control "the flux and smash of the world through the small ordered word
patterns I make." This craft enabled her to survive for a while and to
exhibit, like an athlete or nuclear physicist, some of the questionable feats
that human technology can accomplish. But our praise for her craft ought to be
highly qualified--because in her case, it was madness.